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Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience
Kent Greenawalt*
INTRODUCTION

One aspect of the issue of toleration of religion is how far the
government and others should recognize religious claims of conscience.
Such claims will be present in any liberal democracy. The particular
controversies in focus shift, but certain underlying themes remain.
In this Essay, I outline what I take to be the major issues regarding
government recognition of religious claims of conscience. I then address
the special problems created when a claim of conscience ends up
competing with an opposing claim of conscience or with basic premises
about fairness and justice. We can conceive of these as competing claims
of toleration. Just such competition is involved when the question is a
possible exemption from compliance with laws that recognize same-sex
marriage and from laws that require insurance coverage of contraceptive
drugs, two prominent issues in our present political setting.
I. BASIC ISSUES ABOUT GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS OF
RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE

For the standard issue of conscience, the question is whether individuals
or organizations should be allowed to engage in or avoid actions if doing
so complies with their conscience, even though those actions are generally
forbidden or required. The most notable example from United States
history was the question of whether pacifists should be drafted into the
military or jailed if they refused to comply. Here, the precise issue involves
compliance of an individual person with a requirement of the government.
In the United States, the primary locus of resolving that question has been
Congress, the national legislature, with the Supreme Court exercising
implausible constructions of the statutory language to extend coverage in
important respects.1
* This essay has benefitted greatly from discussions at conferences at the University of Colorado,
at the University of San Diego Law School, and from discussions at the University of Virginia School
of Law. James Nelson and Joel Harrison offered very helpful comments on prior drafts and Michael
Fernandez provided excellent research assistance.
' My understanding of those cases appears in KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION VOL. 1: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 49-67 (2006) [hereinafter Free Exercise] and in
Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat ofSelective ConscientiousObjection, 1971 SUP. CT.
REv. 31-94 (1971).
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But it is worth noting at the outset the range of variations of the relation
between governments and the recognition of such claims. Some claims of
conscience are constitutionally protected, or are basic human rights,
recognized by international law. Other claims may be asserted as rights
that legislatures or executive officials have respected or should respect, but
which are not themselves established by constitutional or international law.
Other claims may properly be conceived not as "rights," but as providing
the bases for the exercises of discretion by those in authority. The focus of
the essay is on what are wise choices about recognizing claims of
conscience; I do not examine exactly how the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and other statutes should be interpreted or how far the
Constitution should be read to protect individual conscience and related
organization claims.
A government's concessions may be to organizations as well as to
individuals. One may fairly question whether organizations can have a
"conscience." I believe that in some circumstances this is a proper
extension of the basic concept, but for practical purposes the crucial issue
is not whether we call these "exemptions based on conscience," but
whether particular kinds of organizations should receive exemptions from
ordinary requirements on bases like those on which individual claims
might be recognized. Most obviously, an exemption for an organization
may effectively fulfill the sense of conscience of individual members and
leaders. In his book, Conscience and the Common Good, Robert K.
Vischer emphasizes how crucial private associations are to the formation
of individuals' senses of conscience, and urges that they need protection
2
for this reason.
Once we bring organizations into the picture, we quickly realize that the
government's relation to claims of conscience can vary from that present in
the draft example and many others. First, claims of conscience need not be
directed at the government. Private businesses and universities might be
asked to recognize claims made by employees or students. For example, a
student might ask to have his Saturday exam delayed because it would
conflict with his sense of what God wills that we do on that day. Second,
the government may be involved, but in a different way than granting an
individual or organization an exemption from a legal requirement. The
government can instead insist that organizations grant exemptions to
individuals from requirements that the organization (or the government)
2 ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE BETWEEN
PERSON AND STATE 9, 10,44, 71, 97 (2010).
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sets. Thus, hospitals may be forbidden to dismiss or penalize nurses for
refusing to participate in abortions that the hospitals have chosen to
perform.
With respect to the precise content of any exemption based on
conscience, a number of crucial questions arise. Among these are: (1) what
counts as a relevant claim of conscience?; (2) should an exemption be
limited to religious conscience or extended to all claims of conscience?; (3)
must such claims be sincere, and how may sincerity be determined?; (4)
must the claimant's relation to the action to which she objects be close or is
peripheral involvement sufficient?; (5) what, if any, considerations should
outweigh claims of conscience that ordinarily would warrant acceptance?;
and (6) should standards of exemption be cast in general or specific terms?
I shall address each of these questions in turn, highlighting the central
issues and indicating the general responses I would give, but without
exploring the issues in depth, or aiming to develop precise legal guidelines.
For each question, I shall also note another dichotomy-that between
what would make sense in some ideal setting and what is a desirable
resolution in our actual social context. I should acknowledge at the outset
that both these notions have vague, and open-ended, content. Ideal as to
what? Are we talking about perfect people with perfect motivations and
perfect insight into what is right and wrong? No. What I am treating here
as "ideal" does not go that far, but it does assume that officials and others
are capable of ascertaining all relevant facts, that they will understand and
apply accurately whatever standards are set, and that they need not give
way to irrational resentments and prejudices. What this construction allows
us to do is to see what deviations from otherwise desirable standards are
needed to respond to human difficulties of fact-finding and norm
application or to regrettable misunderstandings and hostilities that are
common in a society.
When we turn to "actual social context," we might focus on the political
balance of the moment and what compromises will or will not work in a
particular jurisdiction when an exemption is being considered. My
reference here is more general, mentioning aspects of American culture but
without tackling just what is feasible at a particular time and place.

For an insightful examination that is much more specific, see Robin Fretwell Wilson, The
Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes
Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REv. 1417 (2012).

94

JournalofLaw and Politics

[Vol.XXVIII:91

A. What Counts as a Claim of Conscience?4
As with most fundamental concepts, the coverage of "conscience" is by
no means precise. For our purposes, the serious question is not the outer
boundaries of the proper use of the term, but what needs to be seriously
considered if one is thinking about exemptions based on conscience. Three
central concerns are: whether conscience involves a substantial intensity of
conviction; its relation to moral judgments and self-identification; and
whether, for practical purposes, we should conceive of organizations as
having claims of conscience.
If we think about conscience as usually connected to moral judgments,
we assume it involves a certain intensity of conviction, a sense that a
wrong that one might commit is of a substantial magnitude. Such intensity
and magnitude is not implied in all ordinary uses of the word. I might say
to a friend, "You've made a perfectly reasonable suggestion of what I
should do, but somehow my conscience tells me that would be wrong."
Here, "conscience" expresses a sort of feeling about right and wrong, one
that I may not know how to defend on a reasoned basis (or whose defense I
am disinclined to offer my friend). In another situation, I might say, "My
conscience tells me I should take the children out to play," without
implying that a failure to do so would be a serious moral wrong. For these
usages of "conscience" that do not connote a sense of a serious wrong, I
might well be willing to act contrary to its implications if that were needed
to avoid an adverse consequence. But in most contexts, asserting that
something is a matter of "conscience" implies a strong moral conviction. It
suggests my belief that I should be willing to suffer serious adverse
consequences rather than perform the act. We do not suppose someone is a
genuine conscientious objector to military service if he thinks he should
serve rather than spend two years in jail. He would not fail to be such an
objector if he did not have the moral courage to act on that conviction, but
if he were actually willing to suffer no adverse personal consequence, we
certainly would doubt the intensity of his moral sense. So objections of
"conscience" typically do imply both a strong intensity of conviction and a
sense of serious moral wrong. Just what the required intensity and
magnitude would need to be to cross the line might vary with the
seriousness of the act in question. Given the sacrifice that those who
submit to the draft are making, one's objection would need to be very
powerful if military service is the question; a lesser intensity and sense of
4I explore aspects of this issue in Kent Greenawalt, The Significance ofConscience, 47 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 901 (2010).
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magnitude might suffice if the question were whether a person should tell a
"white lie" to assuage a friend's feelings, and she objected in conscience to
doing so.
A central question about this issue of intensity and magnitude is
whether it should implicitly be incorporated as part of the standard for a
legal exemption. Perhaps for some matters, all moral objections should be
accommodated. A serious practical problem is that those persons deciding
whether an individual qualifies for an exemption may be hard put to judge
a claimant's intensity of feeling and sense of wrongness. Nonetheless, one
might think such language in the law sends the message that only those
with genuinely powerful feelings should be exempted and may help
discourage those with lesser moral objections from applying for an
exemption.
The very connection of "conscience" to moral judgment is more elusive
than the need for intensity of conviction. Apart from certain religious
claims, for virtually all of the practical issues involving exemptions that are
primarily conceived as based on "conscience," conscience is related to
morality. The objector believes that performing the otherwise required act
would be deeply immoral, an act toward other beings on earth that wrongs
them. I use "other beings" rather than "persons" because I think ideas
about decent treatment of animals are moral ideas, as are notions about the
stage at which embryos and fetuses deserve protection (even if they are not
yet considered persons). 6
It has sometimes been suggested that claims of conscience are tied to
personal identification or connected to the search for the ultimate meaning
of life.7 I reject the ultimate meaning approach, because many people feel
claims of conscience that are not related in any conscious way to their
sense of life's meaning or their search for that meaning.
The connection to personal identification is less simple. When we have
deep moral convictions, they are likely to be part of our sense of ourselves.
But what if we have an aspect of our personal identity that is not connected

Vischer, supra note 2, at 71 (referring to the exercise of conscience as communicating "a person's
moral convictions to the surrounding society.")
6 An interesting development in this regard is the recent limitation of using "chimps" for research.
See James Gorman, U.S. Will Not Finance New Research Involving Chimps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2011, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/science/chimps-in-medicalresearch.html.
7
See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION
OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 168-69 (2008).
8 1 pass over versions of an "ultimate meaning" approach that are so amorphous they include

virtually every attempt to understand any important dimension of human existence or responsibility.
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to our moral judgment? Consider this response by a scholar to a complaint
that he is paying insufficient attention to family members who need him:
"You are probably right about my moral responsibilities, but my
conscience tells me I am first and foremost an intellectual and that, even if
I am not a particularly able scholar and have little influence, the search for
truth is what I must devote my attention to." I am not sure whether we
should regard this as a genuine claim of conscience; what I am sure of is
that law should not create exemptions from ordinary standards based on
such claims of self-identification that do not comport with strong moral
convictions understood as covering responsibilities to others. 9
The connection to moral perspectives is more complicated when we
turn to religious convictions. Many religious believers think they owe it to
God to act in certain ways. That may be because they assume that God
directly seeks such behavior or that God has placed authority in particular
human individuals and institutions, and these require the behavior. A
typical Roman Catholic priest believes, as a matter of conscience, that he
should not reveal what is told him in confession, regardless of how
damaging his silence may be to innocent individuals.o One could conceive
this as involving a moral responsibility to the person making the
confession, or as a necessary safeguard to keep the practice of confession
effective, but priests who did not find either of these bases independently
persuasive would still think their religious position requires that they
remain silent. Simpler claims of religious conscience that are not "moral"
in any simple sense are to cover one's head, or not to work on the Sabbath,
or not to eat certain foods. Plainly, some nonmoral claims of this sort
should be accommodated, whether as a matter of established rights or
individual judgments by those with authority. We might better treat many
of them simply as claims of religious exercise, without worrying whether
they also amount to claims of conscience. However, if someone stands to
be seriously harmed by their exercise, as could be true if the priest's
silence allows an innocent person to be convicted, we might want to
require that the claimant has the intensity of feeling and sense of
magnitude associated with "conscience."
Can an organization have a "conscience"? One way of speaking
undoubtedly is that consciences are individual, that it is a misnomer to
attribute "conscience" to organizations. In respect to ordinary usage,
' Such convictions can be present for those who feel a "calling" to help others in particular ways,
such as working as a nurse or a cleric.
1nThe absolute duty is compared with the approaches of other clerics in a discussion of particulars
for confidential communication to clergy in Free Exercise, supra note 1, at 246-60.
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however, we might say this: "If there is a small group of individuals who
work together in some way, and all share a particular view about what
conscience demands, we can say that the organized group has a claim of
conscience to that effect." For example, "The Smith family has a
conscientious objection to abortion." The terminology becomes much more
disputable if we are talking about an organization in which the
authoritative doctrine and the actual view of most "individuals at the top"
asserts that, as a matter of conscience, people (or believers) should not
engage in certain behavior, but the organization includes many individuals
who happen not to share that perspective. The crucial practical question is
not whether it conforms with ordinary usage to say, "Roman Catholic
hospitals believe as a matter of conscience abortions are wrong"; it is
rather, whether exemptions should be granted to organizations on the
ground of the conscientious views of crucial members of the organization.
That is a difficult problem that I will postpone for later discussion.
B. Should Religious Claims of Conscience Be Treated Specially?
There are two basic reasons not to force people to act against what their
conscience tells them. The first is that in a society that values individual
liberty and autonomy, we should hesitate to require people to do what their
conscience tells them is deeply wrong. This reason applies in personal
relationships and within private organizations as well as in relations
between the government and its citizens. Ordinarily, one would not seek to
push a family member or friend to do what she says would violate her
conscience, and a business or university may try to formulate duties that
are consistent with the consciences of those subject to their requirements.
Similarly, if the government can avoid trespassing on the consciences of its
citizens, that is healthy, barring strong countervailing reasons.
The second basis for accommodation relates to the practical
implications that flow from the intrinsic nature of conscience. If people
really do feel that an act would violate their conscience, they will be
hesitant to perform the act, even under pressure. This can set up
unproductive conflict and waste. In the family context, if one insists that a
spouse or adult child perform an act she says would violate her conscience,
one threatens family harmony. If, despite one's insistence, the family
member refuses to perform the act, one has failed to achieve one's aim and
now faces the unpleasant dilemma of how to respond. If a conscientious
objector to military service is put in jail, the government has failed to add
to military personnel, has consigned the objector to an unproductive period
of life, and has expended public resources. Of course, imposing such
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sentences may weed out those who are not sincere objectors and may
provide a sense of fairness for those who do submit to the draft, but these
are high prices to pay. These values of refusing exemptions altogether can
be substantially achieved by instead requiring alternative nonmilitary
service of successful objectors.
A more positive practical reason for recognizing claims of conscience is
that allowing people to act on their developed moral sense can be healthy
for society. We all benefit from the exercise by others of moral convictions,
and in a free society we need to recognize that variations in particular
convictions can themselves be desirable.
Thus, we can start from the premise that if many citizens are
conscientiously opposed to performing certain acts, that is a good reason to
think seriously about a possible exemption from what is generally required.
Are there reasons to exempt only religious claims of conscience? This
turns out to be anything other than a simple question, and much may
depend on exactly what exemption is being considered. The issue can be
sidestepped, but not really avoided, by treating all claims of conscience as
religious. The Supreme Court took a substantial step in this direction in
Welsh v. United States when the plurality concluded that people "whose
consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,
would give them no rest or peace" if they became an instrument of war,
qualified under the Selective Service Act's requirement of religious
belief." It was widely assumed that this stretching of the language was
designed to avoid the constitutional objection that, at least in this context,
religious objectors could not be treated more favorably than nonreligious
ones. 12
In one sense, it is a kind of insult to nonbelievers to say that all claims
of conscience are religious. Some people live their lives rejecting positive
claims of religion or without relying either on such claims or on rejections
of religious truth. They develop their moral senses and evaluate moral
issues according to other criteria. In a society like our own, many religious
believers have moral convictions-for example, about family or
professional responsibilities-that are not derived from their religious
understandings. On a thorough examination, those people might well be
able to connect these convictions to their religious understanding and
" 398 U.S. 333, 342-44 (1970).
12Justice Harlan, concurring (and a necessary vote to constitute a majority), did take the position
that the statutory language itself favored religious claims, but that nonreligious objectors should be
included in the exemption because it would be unconstitutional to do otherwise. Id. at 344-62 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
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affiliation, but religion is not their primary source. If people undoubtedly
can have nonreligious moral convictions, they can also have such
convictions that have the intensity of claims of conscience. Against a
possible argument that religious people will feel claims of conscience more
intensely, because of belief in a Higher Authority, the answer is that not all
religions posit such an Authority, and that if a Christian believes that God
is ready to forgive all confessed sins, he may feel no worse about doing
what he takes as a moral wrong than those who do not believe in God.
We can quickly identify reasons not to single out religious conscience.
The most obvious reason is that it seems intrinsically unfair, if not actually
unconstitutional, to draw such a distinction among people with equally
strong moral convictions. A second reason is the difficulty of drawing the
line about which claims of conscience count as religious. This line-drawing
problem involves both the difficulty of saying what exactly makes
something religious, and the manner in which many religious people have
moral convictions that do not seem directly grounded in their religion, but
may bear some relation, perhaps remote, to that religion.
What arguments might be made for limiting exemptions to religious
claims? One might, of course, say that they have a special constitutional
status; but even if the Free Exercise Clause is a reason to accommodate
religious claims of conscience, it is not, in and of itself, a solid basis to
deny extension to nonreligious claims of conscience.
The most obvious reason to limit claims to religious ones is the absence
or implausibility of parallel nonreligious ones. More subtle distinctions
involve how far society should be dictating the morality of its citizens, and
what message an exemption may send about what is acceptable. Another
concern is the basis for some nonreligious moral judgments. Finally, tied to
these other reasons, is the fundamental idea that religious institutions
should be largely free of government control.
When one thinks of conscientious objection to military service, we have
no difficulty imagining nonreligious claims. A vegetarian's objection to
eating meat could also have a nonreligious grounding. But we find it
harder to think of a nonreligious claim of conscience never to eat pork or
lobster in particular, or to wear a certain kind of clothing, or not to work on
a particular day of the week. 13 As the claims move away from moral
appraisals, the likelihood increases that claims connected to religion will
not be matched by nonreligious claims. Even as to moral claims, some may
" Perhaps a parent's moral sense that he or she should spend time with their children could rise to
a moral claim of conscience not to work regularly on all days when the children are out of school.
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seem effectively limited to religion. Although natural law theorists present
nonreligious reasons why it is wrong to use any contraceptive devices, I
would be surprised if their claims, resting on a sense of the intrinsic nature
of proper sexual behavior, a certain kind of moral view, seem persuasive to
more than a minute percentage of nonbelievers. 14 For the various kinds of
claims connected to religious convictions and practices for which
nonreligious analogies are hard to imagine, limiting an exemption to
religious grounds makes sense. Of course, one might counter that including
nonreligious claims will then not do any harm, since no one will assert
them.
More perplexing issues involve what the formal organ of the general
society should regard itself as confident to assert, and what message a
government exemption will send. Liberal democratic governments, by their
very nature, are not experts about religion; they lay no claim to have the
expertness to determine what God expects of us. By contrast, officials may
regard themselves as able to make judgments of nonreligious morality. If
someone claims on nonreligious grounds that all war is immoral, we might
point to Nazi rule in Germany and say that an unwillingness to fight back
against Hitler's armies would predictably have been ruinous to much of the
world. Against this proposal that governments are better equipped to make
judgments of nonreligious morality than religious morality, a possible
response is that what governments are capable of doing is making factual
judgments, 15 that they are no better equipped to make nonreligious
normative evaluations than religious ones. If matters turn on discernible
facts, it is true that officials may more easily identify "mistakes" others
make than when the crucial disagreement is over values. But the
government also has reason to be hesitant to override religiously based
conclusions, say about whether a particular war qualifies as "just," even
when such conclusions rest on an inaccurate factual assessment.
I also believe that the government is better equipped to make persuasive
choices of value when these rest on shared cultural morality and rational
analysis than when they rest on religious premises. It is true that some
14A brief explanation of why this view will be unpersuasive to most of those who are not relying

on religious reasons is offered in Kent Greenawalt, How Persuasive is NaturalLaw Theory?, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1647 (2000). Considering natural law accounts based either on teleology or selfevidence, KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION VOL. 2, ESTABLISHMENT AND

FAIRNESS 500-04, 511-20 (2008) [hereinafter Establishment], explores the relation of such accounts to
public reason. In Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1111, 1156-57 (2011), the author

suggests various claims for privileges that could be directly connected to religious skepticism.
'5 See Adam J. Kolber, Alternative Burdens on Freedom of Conscience,47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 919
(2010).
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nonreligious comprehensive views are based on premises that are no more
establishable by reason than various religious perspectives, and the moral
conclusions of some religious outlooks may be tested by rational analysis
against the basic premises of the religion; but in general, religiously based
conclusions are harder for officials to assess than nonreligious views,
especially if the latter are grounded in a widely shared social morality.
Connected to the capacity of assessment is the message that an
exemption may send. Insofar as an exemption is directed entirely or mainly
at religiously based conscience, it can be cast as one aspect of
accommodation, or toleration, of religious conviction and practice. That
seems distinguishable from a judgment about the intrinsic plausibility of
the religious conclusion. An exemption that extends to all claims of
conscience may seem to acknowledge that the basic position taken by the
claimants is not wholly unreasonable. When national security, or basic
issues of justice and fairness are involved, the government may not wish
implicitly to make such a concession. Thus, allowing a religion to limit
clergy to males does not seem nearly as much a concession to the
acceptability of gender discrimination as would a concession that any
organization that feels strongly that officials should be limited to one
gender may do so.
The distinction between religious and nonreligious claims has special
force when one turns to possible exemptions for organizations. Religious
institutions have been regarded for much of the history of this country as
desirably independent of the government. Whether or not one thinks, as I
do, that religious groups appropriately play a part in our political life,16 it is
desirable that they not be under government control. This is partly because
such independence is healthy; it is partly because governments in liberal
democracies should not be regarded as competent to assess religious
truth.17 One can, of course, see similar advantages in having certain other
nongovernmental organizations that are largely independent, that can
operate as a kind of check and limit on government power.18 But there is
much less sense that these organizations should generally be able to
16For

a summary of my outlook, see Establishment, supra note 14, at 497-537.
premise is a central feature of the Supreme Court's approach to disputes over
what group
should control church property. See Free Exercise, supra note 1, at 261-89.
8 This observation seems more apt for organizations that have a wide range of objectives and
outlooks, such as nonreligious universities, than organizations created for limited, nonideological,
nonpolitical purposes, such as hospitals. A complication about the nature of organizations involves
those that are formally nonreligious but owned by persons whose purpose is in part to further religious
objectives or who have powerful convictions that they should not violate religious standards. I do not
tackle the question ofjust what possible privileges such groups should be afforded.
17This
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operate on premises at odds with particular fundamental values held within
a modem liberal democracy. As a consequence, when it comes to
organizations, the reasons for limiting exemption claims to religious
institutions are generally stronger than the reasons for limiting individual
claims of conscience to those that are religiously based. This conclusion
about organizations is partly based on the necessity of drawing lines; that
some nonreligious organizations may have reasons for exemptions as
strong as those of some religious organizations does not imply that, for
purposes of clarity and administrability, the religion/nonreligion distinction
fails.
A particular concern exists about some individual nonreligious moral
outlooks, one that might arise with respect to vaccinations. (A similar
concern could arise with a religious conviction as well, but that seems
substantially less likely.) Many parents feel their primary moral obligation
is to their own children. This could rise to a conviction of conscience that
the parents should not sacrifice their children's specific interests even if
that were somehow overall desirable. Here is a troubling illustration: If no
one is vaccinated against a serious disease, such as polio, the slight risk
created by a vaccination is far outweighed by the benefit of being protected.
So rational parents would want their children vaccinated. But if almost
everyone else has been vaccinated, the risk to any individual child now
being vaccinated may be greater than the increased risk of getting the
disease if he is not vaccinated. Were the government to allow all parents to
decide for their children on the basis of such calculations, of course one
problem would be serious misjudgments. But even parents who managed a
precise assessment of comparative risks might opt against vaccination in a
way that would slightly reduce the risks to their particular children but
increase overall risk in a socially undesirable way.19 This could be a reason
to limit any exemption to those whose religion teaches that vaccinations
are wrong.
Another reason to limit exemptions to religious conscience is that it
may be easier to identify honest assertions than with nonreligious claims.
Even if one assumes, as I do, that what counts for religious claims of
individuals is what they believe, not the dominant view of their religious
'9 To illustrate, let us assume a single magnitude of harm. When the vast majority of others are
vaccinated, a child not vaccinated suffers one chance in 10,000 of suffering the harm by getting the
disease, and, if vaccinated, one chance in 5,000 of harm from the vaccination process. If the
unvaccinated child gets the disease, the odds are he will spread it to three other children. The harm
from being vaccinated is not transmitted to others. Thus the overall risk of refusing the child's
vaccination would be four chances out of 10,000, or one in 2,500, of harm, as compared with one
chance in 5,000.
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institutions, and one further recognizes that some religious claims,
including a number of those raised by prisoners, are offered by individuals
as based on personal convictions that are not tied to the premises of
particular religious institutions, 20 nevertheless, many religious claims can
be simpler to assess because they are connected to standards of organized
religions.
My own view is that whether a religion-only exemption is warranted
depends on exactly what the exemption will be, and that issue needs to be
carefully faced. For individuals, but not organizations, I think most
exemptions granted to moral conscience should be extended to
nonreligious claimants. But whatever one concludes about that, it is crucial
to recognize two basic features: There are special reasons for governments
to recognize religious claims of conscience, and these reasons can have
weight in the decision whether to provide any exemption at all. Even when
these reasons apply with sufficient force to warrant an exemption, they do
not settle whether, either as a matter of justice or wisdom, a similar
exemption should also be granted to nonreligious claims of conscience.
C. Sincerity and Its Assessment
To be valid, must a claim of conscience be sincere? In one sense, the
obvious answer is "Yes." People who clearly lie about their conscience
should not be given an exemption from ordinary requirements. The main
problem about sincerity is the practical problem of assessing it by those
who decide on the applications of an exemption. With the draft exemption,
draft boards made that determination after a fairly extensive examination,
although as the Vietnam War continued, federal courts required objective
evidence of insincerity, not so easy to come by.2 1 When exemptions are
granted for less important matters, one cannot expect a searching
examination of sincerity. This is a problem, although its dimensions vary
considerably.
If an exemption, such as one from participating in the sale of morning
after pills, confers no ordinary advantage on the person who claims that
participation would violate his conscience, and if the seeking of an
20See, e.g., Nilsson v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., No. 09-40019-FDS, 2011 WL 1235474 (D. Mass.
2011). It may be important that an increasing number of Americans consider themselves religious but
unaffiliated.
Pew
Research
Center,
"Nones"
on
the
Rise
(Oct.
19,
2012),
http://www.pewforum.org/unaffiliated/nones-on-the-rise.aspx.
" See, e.g., United States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383, 389 (8th Cir. 1969); Donald L. Doemberg, Pass
in Review: Due Process and Judicial Scrutiny of Classification Decisions of the Selective Service
System, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 871 (1982). I happened to review such cases from 1971 to 1972 as a deputy
solicitor general.
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exemption is likely to cause irritation of superiors or colleagues that could
down the road hurt chances for a promotion or informal benefits, a person
has no incentive to make an insincere claim. On the other hand, if the claim
for an exemption is not to work on Saturday, or to refrain from having a
child vaccinated, we can imagine that someone who wishes to spend the
day with his family, or to avoid vaccination risks for his child, might
announce an insincere objection in conscience. For those who run
businesses, a possible reason to assert an insincere claim is that performing
the required act would disturb one's clients or workers. One way of
minimizing the success of insincere claims is, as I have suggested, to limit
an exemption to religious claims, which many people may be more hesitant
to make up, given the typical tie of religious convictions to institutional
affiliations.
A nuance about a sincerity claim concems the intensity and sense of
magnitude of an objection in conscience. Someone might have a moral
objection to performing an act that does not rise to the level of conscience.
Outsiders will be hard put to judge exactly the force of another's moral
convictions, and to evaluate what degree is necessary to constitute a claim
of conscience. What the claimant believes she should suffer if not
accommodated is one test; and someone who loses her job or is demoted
because she actually refuses to perform an act has helped to demonstrate a
true claim of conscience. But those whose claim for an exemption is
granted usually are not put to such a clear test. In any event, a connection
to religious conviction, say that God or church teaching absolutely forbids
particular behavior, could be one test of whether a sense that an act is
morally wrong rises to the necessary degree of intensity and magnitude.
Of course, another way of dealing with this particular problem is not to
require a claim of conscience, rather than granting the exemption to anyone
with a belief that the required act would be morally wrong. Some
exemptions have been cast in this form.22 The concern about this strategy is
that it might open an exemption too far to those with lukewarm
reservations. Yet another approach, one I believe should be considered
more than it has been, is to allow anyone to receive the exemption if that
person undertakes to do what most people would regard as at least as
onerous as the required act. Thus, if a university student objects to certain
uses of a yearly $400 fee to support student organizations, let the student
22 A summary of the laws providing exemptions in respect to health care, and their
various
formulations, is in Lynn D. Wardle, Protection of Health-Care Providers' Rights of Conscience in
American Law: Present,Past,and Future,9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 16-33 (2010). Wilson, supranote 3,
at App. A, gives an account of state law exemptions in regard to same-sex marriage.
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contribute the same amount or slightly more to a scholarship fund instead.
A similar approach could be used by governments for people who object to
uses of their ordinary taxes. This strategy avoids the need for an observer
to judge a claimant's sincerity and intensity of conviction.
D. Degree ofInvolvement
Does it matter how close the involvement of a claimant is to what is for
her an objectionable act? One might think this is intrinsically relevant, or
that it will affect how others respond to an exemption, or that it is
indirectly one measure of sincerity, or that it affects whether the claimant
can perform a sufficient component of his duties. If we think about
hospitals that perform abortions, we have doctors asked to perform them,
nurses asked to assist, technicians who set up the operating room for their
performance, nurses who care for patients in their rooms, personnel who
make beds and clean rooms, admissions officers who interact briefly with
patients entering the hospital, and persons who keep hospital records,
including what procedures are performed on which patients. Within
drugstores, there are individuals in charge of running the store, druggists
who fill prescriptions, clerks who hand drugs to customers, cashiers who
accept payments, and personnel who place products on shelves and keep
the stores clean. The intuitive appeal of granting an exemption seems to
increase the more closely an individual would be involved in the procedure
to which he objects.
The basic point about a claimant's ability to function in a job is
straightforward. Given that hospitals perform abortions and women have a
constitutional right to receive them, a hospital employee whose religious
conversion has led him to believe that all abortions are a form of murder
cannot assert both that virtually any job at such a hospital would violate his
conscience, and that, nonetheless, he cannot be dismissed for his refusal to
perform a job that is remote from the actual procedure.
The intrinsic relevance of degree of involvement is more debatable.23
According to most people's ordinary sense, if a person's job calls upon her
to receive answers from questionnaires that admitted patients have
answered and to exchange a few words with those patients, an objection to
such contact with the patients who happen to be entering to receive
abortions would be unreasonable. The counterargument would be that all
23 For a case involving such peripheral involvement, see Spellacy v. Tri-County Hosp.,
Equity No. 77-

1788, 1978 WL 3437 (Pa. C.P.1978). The case arose under Title VII, which may cover such instances
but according to which, as the Supreme Court has interpreted it, employers need only make modest
efforts to accommodate.
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that matters is sincerity of conscience. As Steven Shiffrin puts it, "the
question should not be what society regards as too remote, too principled,
too fastidious, too crazy, or too offensive." 24 If the person really feels that
she cannot in good conscience have any dealings with those who will
receive abortions and the hospital can disengage her from those contacts
without great inconvenience, why not allow her to disengage?
I have no decisive answer to this counter, but I do not find it fully
persuasive. I believe society is warranted in saying simply that some
connections are so remote that they should not give rise to exemptions
from duties. Still further, if exemptions reach too broadly, they will seem
unacceptable to much of the public. Requiring some closeness of
connection to the act to which one objects can be an indirect way of
assuring an employee's basic sincerity and that his moral objection really
rises to the intensity of conscience.
At least for some people, the sincerity problem may have a special
flavor when involvement in the act objected to would be peripheral and no
adverse consequences would flow from obtaining the exemption. An
individual may actually have a very strong moral objection to a particular
act, and may wish to register that publicly in order to impress and influence
others. Even if she would not on examination feel that she herself was
doing any serious moral wrong by submitting to a highly peripheral
involvement, such as admitting an abortion patient into the hospital, she
might regard her claim not to do so as expressing her moral sense better
than any message sent on Twitter could do. She might even hope, and
believe, that if other workers followed her lead, the hospital might change
its policy about offering abortions. Thus, she would have a deep moral
sense about abortion, but not truly believe that a highly peripheral
involvement would violate her conscience. This highly subtle form of
insincerity25 seems much more likely when involvement is remote than
when it is direct.
I conclude that exemptions for claims of conscience may properly
require that a claimant's responsibilities would otherwise connect in a
substantial way to the act to which he objects. That would certainly include
direct participation in the act itself, including in the hospital example
24Steve Shiffrin, Gay Weddings: A Note on Town Clerks, Florists, and Photographers
in Response
to Dorf MIRROR OF JUSTICE BLOG, (Oct. 14, 2011, 10:25 AM), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.commirrorofjustice/201 1/10/gay-wedding.html .
25The label "insincerity" here could itself involve a serious oversimplification. If a person realized
an exemption was available, she might rationalize her own perspective to honestly conclude that she
had an objection in conscience.
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preparation of the room for an abortion. 2 6 It might also include extended
personal contact with the person who has chosen to undergo the procedure
the claimant believes is deeply wrong. The objector might somehow feel
she should not provide continuing personal support to someone who is
preparing to commit a grievous wrong, even if the objector would have
nothing directly to do with the operation itself. Just how tight the
connection should be before any objector should succeed should depend on
the nature of the act involved, and on how far an employer need extend
itself if it grants an exemption from the involvement to which the claimant
objects.
E. What Can Outweigh Claims of Conscience?
No one thinks claims of conscience should always excuse a person from
performing otherwise required acts. The process of comparative evaluation
involves three different dimensions. One is denial or inconvenience or a
kind of insulting embarrassment for those who have a right to have the
required act performed. If women have a right to receive morning after
pills, it would be unacceptable if the grant of an exemption would prevent
them from doing so. The harder questions on this score are just when
practical inconvenience or embarrassment are sufficient to override a claim
for an exemption. A second form of inconvenience involves those who are
in charge of seeing that various acts are performed. A business cannot be
expected to go to an extreme expense to make up for an objecting worker's
conscientious refusal to perform a certain act. Both these kinds of
hardships are straightforward, though saying when hardship or
inconvenience is great enough to override a claim for exemption can be
very difficult and highly controversial. How should legislators drafting
laws or courts applying general statutory language strike the balance? A
just answer is not only hard, it almost certainly depends on the particular
nature of the act and the foundation of the claim of conscience.27
A third countervailing reason against claims of conscience is different.
It asserts that the very message sent by acknowledging the claim is
unacceptable, that people broadly need to understand that certain actions
are simply not to be tolerated, or, in the case of officials, that those who
26 When I previously considered this question, I failed to address the situation
of a close connection
to the act to which one objects that need not involve personal contact with the patient on whom the act
is performed. See Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When Should They Be
Accommodated?, 9 AVE MARIA L. REv 47, 60-61 (2007).
27 Vischer, supra note 2, at 26-29, 112 (emphasizing the value of allowing conflicting moral views
to compete in the "market" in circumstances when that will work).

108

JournalofLaw and Politics

[Vol.XXVIII:91

accept such positions must also accept that they have a fundamental
responsibility to perform the duties of those positions. Both these kinds of
countervailing reasons are now often offered by some advocates of samesex marriage, who oppose any broad exemptions from the responsibility to
recognize those marriages and not to discriminate against the couples who
undertake them.2 8 To bolster the argument that it is basically wrong to
permit exemptions, these advocates often draw a comparison with racial
discrimination roughly along these lines: "We would not accept many
exemptions from rules forbidding racial discrimination, whether in
marriage or in other aspects of life. Discrimination against gay people is no
more acceptable than racial discrimination, and exemptions are no more
warranted." This argument has considerable force for those who
acknowledge that those who engage in homosexual relations should be free
from discrimination. I shall say a bit more about it subsequently. What I
want to stress at this stage is that such arguments do not depend on
anyone's immediate practical hardship or inconvenience. Rather, the claim
is that creating an exemption is itself wrong from a moral point of view,
and that such an exemption can retard broader understanding that the
underlying fundamental discrimination is intrinsically unacceptable.
F. The Generality ofFormulations
If exemptions are to be granted for claims of conscience, should they be
in general terms such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 29 or
should they specifically indicate which claims of conscience will be
recognized? If legislators are persuaded that particular exemptions are
warranted, as with abortions, it is probably desirable to specify those
objections in law. 30 A problem with language that is too open is that it may
make initial decisions by private employers and executive government
officials difficult. However, given the wide range of claims of conscience

28Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, In Gay Marriage Debates, Don't Cater to Bigots, WASH. POST
(Jun. 22, 2011, 9:42 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/post/in-gay-marriagedebates-dont-cater-to-bigots/2011/06/22/AGlazjflblog.htm. In a discussion I attended held at the
New York City Bar Association in May 2011, these positions were put forward as counters to claims
that exemptions were desirable.
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2000). The act forbids government from "substantially burden[ing] a
person's exercise of religion" unless it has a "compelling ... interest" and uses "the least restrictive
means."
30 Both federal and state laws protect those who object to participating in abortions. E.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 300a-7 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214; see Mark L. Rienzi, The Constitutional
Right Not to Participate in Abortion: Roe, Casey, and the Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Health
Care Providers,87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (2011).
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people may have, there is also value in more general language. 3 1 This may
be especially true if part of the aim is to accommodate religious practices
and convictions, which will have a wider range of variations than will
nonreligious moral objections. An intermediate approach is for a statute to
employ general language but set up an agency to provide more specific
guidelines.
With this outline of basic premises and questions, we now turn to the
particular complexities when "religious toleration" has multiple
dimensions in relation to possible exemptions.
II. CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF TOLERATION AND How TO RESPOND
With respect to certain issues, toleration and exemption are far from
simple matters. Because there are conflicting claims of toleration, it
becomes debatable whether tolerance favors exemption. This contrasts
with the issue of a pacifist's objection to military service. The pacifist's
position could, in principle, if too widely accepted, put other citizens at
risk, but it does not reflect badly on any other individuals in the society
(except, perhaps, implicitly involving a mild negative judgment about all
those who support war or are willing to fight in one). The sense that one
must eat kosher food is also not a seriously negative view about everyone
who consumes pork. Of course, the unwillingness to participate in an
abortion does reflect a strong moral judgment about a particular act in
which others are engaged, but it need not constitute a negative view about
the individuals who undergo this procedure. It need not be a harsh
judgment about their basic identity. 32 I shall explore how far the issue of
exemption from requirements to treat same sex marriage like marriages
between men and women is similar to and different from these illustrations.
I will then engage a similar inquiry about health insurance and
contraceptives. My focus is primarily on theoretical considerations. I do
not try to assess precisely what the scope of a possible exemption should
be, or what compromises are needed to get underlying legislation adopted
(or maintained).33

Lynn Wardle, supra note 22, at 19-26 (urging a broad general standard).
It is certainly possible that someone's reason for seeking an abortion could seem so degraded
that an observer aware of the reason would make a negative judgment about the whole person.
3 See Wilson, supra note 3, especially Part I, for a detailed analysis of answers to both these
questions.
3'

32
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A. Performanceand Recognition ofSame Sex Marriage
A state adopts a law recognizing same sex marriage. It includes
provisions explicitly or implicitly requiring that public officers issue
marriage licenses to gay couples, and that others not discriminate against
couples entering same sex marriages. Should there be any exemption, and,
if so, what should it look like? We may start with the core assumption that
religious institutions need not perform marriages they actually believe are
invalid. In fact, no antidiscrimination law has required clerics to perform
marriages they regard as unsuitable, and any such requirement would
rightly be regarded as an unconstitutional impingement on the exercise of
religion. Religious bodies cannot be forced to engage in ceremonies. So the
genuine issues concern possible broader exemptions for institutions
connected to religion and possible exemptions for individuals and for
nonreligious institutions. For example, should charities and other religious
bodies be required to treat a couple as married when insuring a member of
the couple who is one of its employees? Should a religiously connected
social organization that rents out its hall be able to refuse its use for a
reception following a same-sex marriage? Should private individuals be
able to refuse a rental to a gay married couple? Should a clerk in the
marriage bureau be able to avoid issuing a marriage license to a gay
couple? 34
Assuming that those who want an exemption maintain a religious
conviction that marriage is a sacred relation and that God wants that
relation only to be between persons of different genders, granting the
exemption is a form of religious toleration. It accommodates powerful
religious convictions that vary from the understandings of the officials who
enacted the law protecting same-sex marriage. Those officials may
represent a social understanding that already predominates in that state,
and, if not, is highly likely to predominate in the relatively near future,
given acceptance of same-sex marriage by younger people.

34 See Marc D. Stem, Same-Sex Marriages and the Churches, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY I (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds.,

2008), for a survey of the astonishingly wide range of conflicts that can be resolved in various ways.
3 Wilson, supra note 3, at 1484-85 (providing some of the relevant statistics about different age
groups from surveys of opinion). According to the Pew Research Center, the percentage of people who
favor same-sex marriage has risen from twenty-seven percent in 1996 to forty-seven percent in 2012.
Peter Baker, Same-Sex Marriage Support Shows Pace of Social Change Acceleration, N.Y. TIMES,
May II, 2012, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/us/same-sex-marriagesupport-shows-pace-of-social-changeaccelerating.html?_r-I &gwh=2B947B9 ICBCC7B4D3C85F 1294518C9C7.
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But does recognizing an exemption also represent a kind of
endorsement of intolerance? Certainly the advocates of gay marriage
suppose that most opposition to that is based on intolerance of gay people.
That is not necessarilythe basis for opposition. Some people, who believe
that sexual relations between members of the same gender are as
acceptable as most other sexual relations and that people should not be
treated differently because they engage in such relations, nevertheless
conceive marriage as special and think God has ordained that it be between
men and women.3 6 Such persons can rightly say that their opposition to gay
marriage does not represent any negative view about gay people or sexual
relations between them. Nonetheless, for most opponents of same-sex
marriage, there does exist an aversion to sexual relations between persons
of the same gender; and for most of those who wish to engage in same-sex
marriage, opposition to that seems to speak of a rejection of a fundamental
aspect of how gay individuals view themselves. 37 In other words, the
opposition to marriage represents to gay persons an unjustified intolerance
that extends beyond any single act. From this perspective, the "toleration"
represented by an exemption from acceptance of gay marriage represents
an acceptance of intolerance, one that may delay the full acceptance of
same-sex marriage.
We can see this appraisal in the comparison with racial segregation and
interracial marriage. If we as a society would be extremely hesitant to grant
any exemption that would allow direct racial discrimination or
discrimination against interracial married couples, should we not take the
same stance toward married couples of the same gender?
Any proposed exemption is undoubtedly complicated by the fact that
unequal treatment of gay couples who wish to marry or are married does
often constitute a form of intolerance and is perceived in this way by gay
couples themselves. But it does not follow that exemptions are a mistake. 39
One important practical reason why they are not a mistake is that in many
states, the granting of some exemptions in any near future may well be
36 For an in-depth examination of bases for opposition and the perceptions of gay people about that
opposition, see Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law 's Social
Meanings,
97 VA. L. REv. 1267, 1308-15 (2011).
37
ld.
38However, as a practical matter, it may be that granting exemptions will "lower the stakes" of the
debate and that failure to grant exemptions will increase divisiveness and actually be worse for
acceptance of same-sex marriage. See Wilson, supra note 3, at 1433-34.

39See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Afterward, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY,

supra note 3434, at 189, 198 (focusing on the competing claims of liberty, suggesting that same-sex
couples are aware "that some fellow citizens vehemently disapprove of what they are doing" and that
exemptions will not greatly increase that sense).
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needed to get enough support for a same-sex marriage bill to pass. But I
want to engage the more principled inquiry of whether exemptions are
warranted even if the legislation would pass without them. For this
question, the precise percentage of people who accept gay marriage is not
crucial.
Although active proponents of exemptions have had the good sense not
to challenge directly the analogy to interracial marriage, 4 0 I think it is
analytically helpful to begin there. So-called bans on interracial marriage
in the United States have never represented neutral bans that treated races
equally; they have been a segment of laws treating blacks as inferior. To
begin with, the bans in some states did not address marriage between
members of Asian "races" to whites or blacks, or both. 4 1Far more crucial
is who counted as "black." We know that male white slave owners with
some frequency had sexual intercourse with slaves that produced
children.42 Even if the slaves involved were wholly of the "African race,"
the children were only fifty percent black. In southern states, a person
counted as "Negro" if he or she had a significant percentage of Negro
blood; typically one quarter or one eighth would be enough.43 Thus, in
some states, a ban on "interracial" marriage meant that a person who was
three-quarters white could marry someone who was completely black but
not someone who was completely white.44 This is not a genuine ban on
interracial marriage; it is a law designed to protect the purity of a superior
race, the white one.45 It would be extremely hard to imagine any principled
40 The analogy is considered and rejected in Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews and
Other Strangers in a
Strange Land: The Casefor ReciprocalAccommodation ofReligious Liberty and the Right ofSame-Sex
Couples to Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389, 413-14 (2010) ("because racism plays such a uniquely
invidious role in U.S. history").

41See PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF
RACE IN AMERICA 81, 92 (2009) (providing charts illustrating anti-miscegenation laws that prohibited
Whites from marrying Asian Americans in 1869 and 1939); Deenesh Sohoni, UnsuitableSuitors: Anti-

Miscegenation Laws, NaturalizationLaws, and the Construction ofAsian Identities, 41 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 587, 596 (2007) (providing table listing anti-miscegenation laws that prohibited Whites from
marrying Asian Americans); see also Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, PreservingRacial Identity:

Population Patterns and the Application of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes to Asian Americans, 19101950, 9 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2002).
42For one account of a complicated racial heritage, see RACHEL L. SWARNS, AMERICAN TAPESTRY:
THE STORY OF THE BLACK, WHITE, AND MULTIRACIAL ANCESTORS OF MICHELLE OBAMA (2012).
43 For the various rules used by southern states to classify individuals of African descent, see F.
JAMES DAVIS, WHO Is BLACK? ONE NATION'S DEFINITION 31-77 (1991); GILBERT T. STEPHENSON,

RACE DISTINCTIONS INAMERICAN LAW 12-24 (1910); Paul Finkleman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 2063, 2109-11 (1993).
44 See, e.g., Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 27-30 (Cal. 1948).
45 See PASCOE, supra note 41, at 7-8; A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial

Purity and InterracialSex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1968
(1989); Reginald Oh, Regulating White Desire, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 463 (2007); Emily Field Van Tassel,
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defense of such laws that does not rest on the need to protect the purity of
the favored race-a defense that would, or should, seem absolutely
outrageous to members of a multicultural, multiracial society.
How is a rejection of same-sex marriage different? Historically,
virtually all cultures and religions have regarded marriage as between
persons of different genders. This is understandable in light of the realities
that, without modem technology, it takes a union of a male and female to
produce children, and that most people's dominant sexual inclination is
toward people of the opposite gender. Neither of those bases is a sound
reason not to allow same-sex marriages, but they do provide a setting in
which the sense that such unions are "unnatural" or "less natural" is
comprehensible. Even many supporters of same-sex marriage who believe
that such marriages are positively desirable for those with corresponding
sexual inclinations may continue to believe that the joining of women to
men in sexual relations, and members of both genders together as the
parental heads of families, is somehow the more natural course. 4 6 It is also
still relevant that sexual relations among persons of the same gender
remained formally criminal in some American states prior to 2003,47 when
the Supreme Court declared such laws unconstitutional. 48 If states
themselves, however lax their actual enforcement, were formally sending
the message that such sexual relations warranted punishment, we can
hardly blame citizens for assuming at that time that such relations were not
desirable, and that formal same-sex marriage was not in prospect. Our
society, and law, have moved a huge distance since then, 49 but how much
can we blame those individuals who cling to the older view? This is
particularly relevant for people who took government jobs never imagining
that they might be called upon one day to facilitate same-sex marriages.
We should recognize two different levels for considering the idea that
resistance to same-sex marriage is more understandable and defensible
"Only The Law Would Rule Between Us": Antimiscegenation, The Moral Economy ofDependency, and
the Debate Over Rights After the Civil War," 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 873 (1995) (giving an account of
how miscegenation laws related to gender and a sense of desirable social organization).
46For a sketch of such views about the sexual acts themselves, see 2 RICHARD P. McBRIEN,
CATHOLICISM 1030-32 (1980).
47"[B]y 2001 only nine states (Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,

South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia) prohibited both same and opposite-sex sodomy, and four states
prohibited only same-sex sodomy (Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas)." Phong Duong, A Survey of
Gay Rights Culminating in Lawrence v. Texas, 39 GONZ. L. REv. 539, 554-55 (2004).
48Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
49
See Erik Eckholm, Push Expands for Legalizing Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/us/advocates-of-gay-marriage-extend-theircampaign.html.
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than resistance to interracial marriage involving white persons. The first is
intrinsic persuasiveness. At this level, an advocate of nondiscrimination
may say that on a careful analysis, discrimination against gays is just as
bad as racial or gender discrimination, that condemnation in the past of
sexual involvement with persons of the same gender was based wholly on
prejudice and ignorance, and has no rational defense. After all, much
classification of women that was once considered "natural" is now
perceived as obviously unjust, and we should see that the same is true
about classifications of gay relationships.
The second level of assessment is whether resistance to same-sex
marriage is now wholly unreasonable for ordinary people. Even if one
thinks such resistance has no genuine rational basis, he may acknowledge
that it will take some time before that perspective is shared by the vast
majority of citizens and is no longer a subject on which people are
seriously divided. In that event, some accommodation may properly be
given in the meantime for those not yet able to perceive the moral truth of
the matter.
Whatever one concludes about the basic rationality of a resistance to
gay marriage, one must recognize that a substantial part of our population
is still opposed to it, so and this includes a significant number of religious
groups with many adherents. " Of course, not all the members of a
religious group will agree with the hierarchy or the prevailing view among
members. Governor Andrew Cuomo, a Roman Catholic, pushed hard and
successfully to get a law authorizing same-sex marriage adopted in New
York.52 But we still have numbers of religious organizations and individual
citizens who are opposed to same-sex marriage, and some of these think it
would be deeply wrong to be positively associated with such marriages.
Even for those, like myself, who believe gay marriages should be
authorized, these reasons point toward the appropriateness of exemptions.
On the other hand, the broader the exemptions, the greater the public signal
may be that the status of same-sex marriage is still questionable. Certainly

5o See, e.g., CNN ORC Poll, Jun. 6, 2012, http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2012/images/06/06/
rel5e.pdf (finding that 42% of those polled in the United States oppose homosexual marriage); Pew
Research Center, Growing Public Support for Same-Sex Marriage, Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.peoplepress.org/2012/02/07/growing-public-support-for-same-sex-marriage/ (finding that 45% of those polled
in the United States oppose homosexual marriage).
5
'Pew Research Center, Religion and Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Marriage, THE PEW FORUM ON
RELIGION & PUBLIc LIFE (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.pewforum.org/Gay-Marriage-andHomosexuality/Religion-and-Attitudes-Toward-Same-Sex-Marriage.aspx.
52 See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Gay Marriage Halo Effect, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2012, at A25,
availableat http://www.nytimes.con2012/02/21/opinion/nocera-gay-marriage-halo-effect.html.
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the widespread exemptions from participation in abortions provide just
such a signal about that, and without doubt that signal was intended by
many of the legislators who voted for protections of those who wished not
to be involved in abortions.
Exactly where this leaves us as a matter of just and wise law is highly
debatable. Alan Brownstein has suggested that given the similarities
between claims of gay persons to marry and claims to religious liberty, the
most helpful analogy for possible exemptions is the right to engage in
religious discrimination. 54 Whatever broad analogy one may find most
persuasive does not settle the precise scope of exemptions.
I believe exemptions in respect to gay marriage should be limited to
religious connections. Both because it is not easy to conceive of powerful
nonreligious opposition to any involvement with gay married couples and
because one aim of a law authorizing their marriage is to help shift
attitudes toward acceptance, the basis for an exemption should not be too
broad. But the law should acknowledge that a number of religious
institutions and individuals do believe that such marriages violate God's
law. Institutions should be allowed, if they assert a religious basis, not to
participate in such marriages, and that right should extend to such
involvements as the rental of halls for receptions celebrating gay marriages.
Should religious institutions be allowed to refuse employment to
members of gay married couples or to deny insurance coverage of a legally
eligible spouse? As to insurance, I think the right answer is "No."
Religious groups that believe civil divorce is invalid from a religious
perspective nonetheless hire some people who have been divorced and
remarried, and their insurance covers the spouse in the second marriage.
Such a group need not acknowledge that the second marriage is really
valid or that the second spouse is really a legitimate spouse; it can say to
itself that it is only affording insurance benefits to such individuals that the

5 Many legislators, like many citizens, disapproved of the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), creating a constitutional right to abortion. See, e.g., S. Amdt. 2321, 106th
Cong. (1999) (Roll Call Vote) available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call-lists/
rollcallvote_cfm.cfm?congress= 106&session= &vote=00337 (in the course of considering a bill
entitled the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2000, there was a vote taken in the Senate on a proposal
to express the sense of Congress in support of the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade that was
passed, 51-47).
54Brownstein, supra note 40, at 405. See also Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and
Religious Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y. 206, 207 (2010). One difference
between religious discrimination and discrimination against gay couples is that the former usually is in
favor of one's own religion, not a reflection of any strong negative judgment about other people and
their religion.
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state treats as married. Groups opposed to same-sex marriage could (and
should) take a similar view about gay married couples."
The hiring question is more complex. For jobs in which a person is
taken to be a representative of the organization, a religious group should
not have to hire someone whose actions clearly violate the group's moral
principles in a way that will be communicated to those directly affected by
the group. A Catholic parochial school should not be required to hire
openly gay teachers, even if these teachers are not involved in religious
subjects. On the other hand, if the school is hiring people to work on a
building, it should not be able to discriminate on the basis of someone's
sexual inclinations or marital partner.
The exemptions granted so far in same-sex marriage laws have mainly
concerned institutions, not individuals. 7 That may be politically savvy, but
it is not fair. Individuals with strong religious convictions should not be
required to facilitate same-sex marriages if their failure to do so causes
neither inconvenience nor a sense of insulting embarrassment for the gay
couple.
It is sometimes argued that no such exemption should be available for
public officials, because they have undertaken to perform the duties of
their offices. This argument is unduly formalistic. If someone otherwise
qualified who takes a public position is glad to perform the vast majority of
its responsibilities, and can easily exchange one particular responsibility
with colleagues in the office, there is no reason to suppose that person
should be refused the job or required to do that to which he objects in
conscience. In fact, we now have many laws, such as the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, that do relieve officials from what would
otherwise be public duties if the exemption creates no serious
inconvenience. Thus, if other clerks are available, and the task can be
shifted to one of them without the gay couple feeling rejected or insulted, I
5 Of course, a group might be adamant that it does not take the view I suggest. Granting an
exemption then might be prudent. See Wilson, supra note 3 at nn. 240-44, (noting that Catholic
Charities in Washington, D.C., chose to eliminate all coverage of spouses). Nonetheless, I believe that
the state can reasonably conclude that the claim for such an exemption reaches "involvement" that is
too remote.
56 In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), the Supreme Court treated a parochial school teacher who had
been commissioned as a "minister" and did some teaching of religious subjects within the "ministerial
exception," according to which she could not challenge her firing in secular courts. The Court was not
precise about the exact boundaries of the individuals within the exception, and it is not certain whether
an ordinary teacher in a parochial school would be covered. I assume that someone hired simply to
work on the building definitely would not be covered.
1 Wilson, supra note 3, App. A at 1509-11, (summarizing the scope of the exemptions in various
states, including those given to individuals by three states).
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do not think clerks whose religious conscience tells them they cannot
perform a same-sex marriage should be required to do so. A nuance about
this particular issue is that some clerks, when they originally took their
jobs, could not have foreseen the legalization of such marriage. It is
particularly harsh to say they must nonetheless perform this task, which
they would never have supposed would be part of their duties.
Individuals should not have a right to discriminate against gay married
couples if their involvement in the marriage itself is much more peripheral
or their contact is at a later stage. Taxi drivers should not be able to refuse
couples a ride to where they will get married or celebrate a marriage.
Landlords other than religious institutions should not be able to
discriminate against gay couples (though someone should be able to refuse
to rent a room in his own apartment, in circumstances that involve
continuing personal contact, to those he believes are engaged in a deeply
immoral relationship).
B. Insurance and Contraceptive Devices
In the early months of 2012 a sharp controversy broke out over
requiring religious organizations other than churches to provide health
insurance that includes free contraceptive devices. The Obama
Administration's "accommodation" to allow the organizations not to pay
insurance companies directly for such coverage has only marginally
affected the debate. 59 Opponents of the Administration's position have
contended that it interferes with religious freedom and invades areas of
private choice. 6 0 Those who resist exemptions claim that opponents are
1 The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3603 (1968) (allowing discrimination when dwellings have
four or fewer rooms or units and one of these is occupied by the owner).
59See N.C. Aizenman, Peter Wallsten & Karen Tumulty, Obama Shifts on Birth Control, WASH.
POST, Feb. 11, 2012, at Al (describing the shift in the Obama Administration's position from requiring
the organizations to pay the insurance companies for coverage to having the insurance companies
financing the use of the contraceptives themselves). See also Ruth Marcus, The Immaculate Fig Leaf
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2012, at Al5, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamascontraception-fig-leaf/2012/02/10/glQApk6S4Q-story.html; Editorial, A Win-Win Reversal, WASH.
POST, Feb. I1, 2012, at A14, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obamas-birthAn
illuminating
control-about-face-is-a-win-win-reversal/2012/02/10/gIQAFmM34Q-story.html.
account of competing positions and approaches to resolutions is in WILLIAM A. GALSTON & MELISSA

ROGERS, HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS' CONSCIENCE AND PATIENT NEEDS: THE QUEST FOR BALANCE,

GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, Feb. 23, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/
files/papers/2012/2/23%20health%20care%20galston%20rogers/0223_health_care-galstonjrogers.pdf.
A thoughtful defense of the Administration's proposal is made by Frederick Mark Gedicks, With
Religious Liberty for All: A Defense of the Affordable Care Act's Contraception Coverage Mandate,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/publications/issuebriefs/with-religious-liberty-for-all-a-defense-of-the-affordable-care-act%E2%80%99s-cont.
60 Timothy M. Dolan, ObamaCare and Religious Freedom, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2012.
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essentially disregarding women's health, freedom and equality. Given the
tenor of the debate and widespread ignorance about how alternative
approaches to coverage might work in practice, getting beyond the
competing and strident contentions about crucial liberties to assess what
strategy may be wise is not easy.
Here are some factual premises, as I understand them. Which, if any, of
these should bear on the scope of exemptions is genuinely debatable, but
they do set my background for understanding. The primary religious
organization that opposes all use of artificial contraceptives is the Roman
Catholic Church. In 1968, the majority of a papal commission established
by Pope John XXIII had actually recommended a change in the Church's
traditional condemnation of use of contraceptives, 61but Pope Paul VI, in
his encyclical Human Vitae, 62 reiterated that condemnation. 63 The vast
majority of women and men regard use of contraceptives as morally
acceptable, 64 and most Roman Catholics who engage in sexual intercourse
have used them. 65 Even if the use of contraceptives does increase slightly
the instances in which people engage in sexual intercourse, given modern
social mores, any effort to sharply reduce sexual intercourse by
discouraging use of contraceptives is doomed to failure. 66 Use of
contraceptive devices by men and women cuts down on transmission of
venereal disease and AIDS; that use and the use by women of pills reduces
6' Douglas E. Kneeland, Majority Report Seeks PapalShift on Contraception,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1967,
at
I,
available
at,
http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=
F6081 FFA3E5E I 37A93C5A8178FD85F438685F9.
62Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae of the Sup. Pontiff Paul VI to his Venerable Brothers
the
Patriarchs, Archbishops, Bishops and Other Local Ordinaries in Peace and Communion with the
Apostolic See, to the Clergy and Faithful of the Whole Catholic World, and to All Men of Good Will,
on the Regulation of Birth (July 25, 1968), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/
paul-vi/encyclicals/documents/hf p-vi enc 25071968 humanae-vitae_en.html
63McBrien, supra note 46, at 1016-26 (summarizing earlier statements, competing arguments, and
reactions to the encyclical).
64See American Voters Hum, 'Happy Days are Here Again,' Quinnipiac University National Poll
Finds, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLLING INST., (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-andcenters/polling-institute/national/release-detail?ReleaselD=1709 (finding that 82% of those polled in
the United States find the use of contraceptives to not be wrong); CNN/ORC Poll, ORC INT'L, (Feb. 16,
2012), http://i2.cdn.tumer.com/cnn/2012/images/02/16/rel2g.pdf (finding that 81% of those polled in
the United States find the use of contraceptives to not be wrong).
65
See Most Catholic Women Use Birth Control Banned by Church, REUTERS, Apr. 13, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/13/us-contraceptives-religion-idUSTRE73C7WO20110413.
That any single person of the Catholic faith has used them in the past does not show that he or she has
done so when a serious practicing Catholic, but the statistics about the high proportion of Catholic
women who have used contraceptives lead one to conclude that a significant proportion of practicing
Catholics involved in sexual intercourse at a stage of their lives when pregnancy might result do use
contraceptives.
66See Laura Sessions Stepp, Study Casts Doubt on Abstinence-Only Programs,WASH. POST, Apr.
14. 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/13/AR2007041301003.html.
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significantly the number of unwanted pregnancies and abortions. There are
other drugs and medical procedures that are commonly covered by
insurance to which various religious denominations object.
Given the very wide use of contraceptives and their acceptance in
society, and the weakness of nonreligious arguments against their use,
substantial claims for an exemption from insurance coverage must rest on
religious bases.67
The preceding paragraphs oversimplify the issues involved with respect
to insurance coverage of contraceptives in two crucial respects, ones that
need to be addressed by anyone seeking an overall resolution of what the
government should require. In an early response to the Administration's
compromise, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops urged that
the failure to clearly protect self-insured religious employers, religious and
secular for-profit employers, secular non-profit employers, religious
insurers, and individuals was "unacceptable and must be corrected." 6 8 Even
if religious organizations using insurance companies were willing to accept
that those companies themselves could provide free contraceptives that the
religious organizations did not directly pay for, that alone would not
resolve what to do with companies that have a different status or a different
relation to insurance.
The other complexity that has been obscured in the primary public
debate is how relevant "contraceptives" work. Standard contraceptives
prevent conception; but it has been assumed until recently that Plan BTM
and EllaTM, as well as morning-after pills previously in use, do sometimes
prevent a fertilized egg from entering the uterus and may work on occasion
to dislodge a fertilized egg from the uterus.69 A recent article in The New
York Times indicated that studies cast strong doubt on whether the pills did
operate at these later stages.70 The article presented stronger evidence that
Plan BTM did not so operate than was available in respect to EllaTM, and it

may well be too quick to reach any such conclusion about EllaTM." For

67It is a separate question whether an exemption granted to religious organizations should be
extended to nonreligious ones.
6
8Press Release, U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops, Bishops Renew Call to Legislative Action on
Religious Liberty (Feb. 10, 2012), http://usccb.org/news/2012/12-026.cfm.
61See Wilson, supra note 3, at 1418, 1455-59.
70See Pam Belluck, No Abortion Role Seen for Morning-After Pill, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/health/research/morning-after-pills-dont-blockimplantation-science-suggests.html; Editorial, How Morning-After Pills Really Work, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2012, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/how-morning-after-pillsreally-work.html.
71See Wilson, supranote 3, at 1457-59.
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those who believe that human life begins at conception,72 drugs operating
in either of these ways constitute a form of abortion; 73 for those who
believe life begins at implantation, dislodging fertilized eggs is abortive.
Although the Catholic Church condemns both contraceptive use and
abortion,74 the latter is regarded as a graver wrong. 5 One illustration of this
is in a 2006 statement by the U.S. Catholic Bishops on receiving Holy
Communion. 76 Among the activities that should lead one not to take
communion without receiving the Sacrament of Penance are "committing
murder, including abortion" and sexual activity outside "a valid
marriage."77 A proposal to name contraception as a reason to refrain from
receiving communion was expressly rejected. 7 8 I infer from the absence of
use of ordinary contraceptives on this list that that use would not
necessarily preclude the appropriate acceptance of communion.79
In what follows, I shall concentrate mainly on the basic question that
has been the leading topic of public discussion: whether, when religious
organizations use independent insurance companies to insure employees,
these companies should provide ordinary contraceptive devices and pills
free to the insured employees.80 But we need to be aware that an acceptable
compromise on that question could fail to settle other important issues.
72 1 refer

here not to the physical facts, but what counts as a life warranting protection.
7 See, e.g., John Cardinal O'Connor, Abortion: Questions and Answers, § 11 (1990), available at
http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisterium/cardocqanda.html ("There is clear evidence that certain
devices called contraceptives, such as the IUD, do not prevent conception. They work as
"abortifacients"; that is, they destroy the fertilized ovum. In other words, they are a means of abortion,
not contraception.").
74 See
CATHECHISM
OF
THE
CATH.
CHURCH
2270-75,
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/-_P7Z.HTM (discussing the Roman Catholic position on
abortion);
PAUL
VI,
HUMANAE
VITAE,
Section
14
(1968),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/paul-vi/encyclicals/documents/hfip-vienc_25071968_humanaevitaeen.html (discussing the Roman Catholic position on contraception); see also Contraception,
Sterilization & Abortion, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-andaction/marriage-and-family/natural-family-planning/catholic-teaching/upload/Contraception.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 19, 2012).
7 Cf O'Connor, supra note 73, § II ("Birth control and abortion are not 'equal evils,' except when
abortion is used as 'birth control.' Contraception prevents the conception of life. Abortion destroys life
already conceived. . . . Except for efforts to exclude abortifacients, I do not know a single Catholic
bishop who would favor civil legislation against birth control.")
76
See Press Release, U.S.Conf. of Cath. Bishops, Happy Are Those Who Are Called to His Supper:
On Preparing to Receive Christ Worthily in the Eucharist (Nov. 14, 2006), available at
http://old.usccb.org/doctrine/Eucharist.pdf.
77 id.

7 Ann Rodgers, U.S. Catholic Bishops Tackle Contraception, Gays, Communion, PITTSBURG
POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/us/us-catholic-bishopstackle-contraception-gays-communion-459376/.
' U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops, supra note 76.
8
See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Poll Finds Division over Requiring Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, at A 15,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/us/politics/americans-divided-on-birth-control-

2013]

Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience

121

Various evaluative judgments and related estimates of fact bear on how
one regards the question of compelled insurance coverage. Questions
concerning both the religiously grounded moral judgments of religious
institutions, and the moral judgments of those who use contraceptives, may
affect the views of citizens and officials about the desirability of an
exemption.
A preliminary judgment concerns the government's role in dictating
what health insurance must cover. If one adopts a libertarian or
conservative stance that this is simply not the government's business, one
may favor limiting such misguided exercises as much as possible. Since
this essay is not the occasion to take on broad issues about the range of
government involvement in providing health care, I shall assume, in accord
with my actual view that, barring some special reason to the contrary,
government rules for the coverage of health insurance are fully appropriate.
One must next ask whether providing free contraceptives is an
important aspect of protecting women's health and avoiding unwanted
pregnancies. Whether contraceptives are a form of "health care" is itself a
debated issue, but one that is primarily rhetorical. 8 ' So long as we know
what they can do in respect to a person's body and life prospects, the key
question is whether they should be easily available. Providing free
contraceptives may not be critical for women who are able to pay for them
without difficulty, but it can be highly important for women who cannot
afford to do so. And the cost of contraceptive pills, the most effective way
to assure that sexual intercourse does not lead to pregnancy, is not
minimal.82
Two competing perspectives then present themselves. Requiring that an
organization provide insurance coverage for acts they regard as immoral
may be seen as demanding that they participate in or encourage these acts.
One might or might not believe this participation is affected if what the
organization pays for directly does not include such coverage, but the
coverage-poll-finds.html; Robert Pear, Senate Rejects Measures Letting Employers Deny Birth Control
Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/
us/politics/senate-kills-gop-bill-opposing-contraception-policy.html.
8' Compare PLANNED PARENTHOOD ACTION CENTER, THE FACTS ON BIRTH CONTROL COVERAGE

FOR WOMEN, http://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/positions/facts-on-birth-control-coverage-forwomen-l 17.htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2012) with Letter from the U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops, to
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee Opposing EPICC (Sept. 10, 2001), available at,
http://old.usccb.org/prolife/issues/abortion/sencom91001.shtml.
2

8 See INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PREVENTATIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 19-20,
109 (2011); see also CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE HIGH COSTS OF BIRTH CONTROL: IT'S NOT AS

AFFORDABLE AS YOU
2012/02/pdf/BCscosts.pdf.

THINK

(Feb.

15,

2012),

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
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insurance company must nevertheless provide it for those who wish it. The
competing perspective is that paying for required insurance (directly or
indirectly) is essentially similar to paying general taxes, in circumstances
when some of that general tax money pays for activities the taxpayer
regards as immoral. One possible stance about these competing
perspectives is that citizens and legislators considering an exemption
should for this purpose just accept whatever is the view of the religious
organizations involved.
An individual woman who takes birth control pills could have different
outlooks about that. She might think she is doing nothing morally wrong,
or she might acknowledge that she is committing a moral wrong, but lacks
the determination to avoid doing wrong by refraining from sexual relations.
One can certainly imagine Roman Catholic women who have each of these
views. A more complex, intermediate, position is also worth considering.
A woman might believe that using artificial contraceptives is, viewed by
itself, morally undesirable; but not nearly as bad morally as having an
abortion. She might feel that if she became pregnant against her wishes,
she would be strongly tempted to seek an abortion. Committing the
relatively minor wrong of using a contraceptive would be a way to prevent
her later committing the much graver moral wrong. Whether one accepts
this form of reasoning as appropriate, it is not illogical. If we know we are
susceptible to committing a grave wrong in certain circumstances, we may
think it is better morally to choose behavior that itself involves a lesser
wrong, rather than to refrain and greatly increase the risk that we will
commit the grave wrong.
For women who regard the ability to use contraceptives as a crucial
aspect of their liberty and wellbeing, measures that would seriously reduce
their availability may seem to be blind to their basic interests, a form of
intolerance of their outlooks on life, and an effective denial of, or
impediment to, the equality of women and men.
When it comes to an evaluation of an individual's behavior by the
religious institutions that seek an exemption, the needed analysis is much
more subtle and complex. I shall sketch here my present grasp of Roman
Catholic perspectives. One may or may not think different outlooks within
the church have any bearing on what concessions should be made to
sincere claims made by Catholic organizations. The official doctrine is
clear that use of artificial means of birth control is a moral wrong. Some
natural law theorists make an argument for this position that rests on the
fundamental nature of sexual intercourse and does not depend on religious
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bases, 8 an argument I have suggested is plausible to few outsiders.
Whatever the persuasiveness of any nonreligious argument, the church has
clearly adopted the position that artificial birth control is wrongful.
Roman Catholic writers over the years, dating back at least to Thomas
Aquinas, have discussed whether one is committing a sin if one
conscientiously concludes that the church's position on a moral issue is
mistaken. 84 One illustration, given in discussions in which I have
participated, is capital punishment. Authoritative church documents now
declare capital punishment to be wrong (barring extraordinary
circumstances), but it has been suggested by some that a loyal church
member could take a different view and that such a view might be an
acceptable basis for a judge to condemn someone to a death sentence. 8'
Over the years there has been considerable disagreement among
Catholic thinkers and members of the hierarchy over just how far this
latitude to act on one's settled convictions extends.8 6 One question is how
far a devout Catholic should consider himself free to develop a personal
conscientious view at odds with the church's expressed position. This
question raises complexities about the nature of moral norms-how far
they are based on reason and are law-like, to what extent do specific
applications depend on particular circumstances, and what is the status of
judgments of the hierarchy (some of which historically have been later
rejected by church officials).87 A closely related question is the range of
issues on which such a Catholic may be at liberty to go against church

8 I briefly outline such arguments and my response to them in Kent Greenawalt, How Persuasive
is Natural Law Theory?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1647, 1666-71 (2000).
8 See Charles E. Curran, Conscience in the Light of CatholicMoral Tradition, in 14 CONSCIENCE:
READINGS INMORAL THEOLOGY 4 (Charles E. Curran, ed., 2004).

8 On the church's position, see CATHECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2267, available at
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/ P7Z.HTM; see also IOANNES PAULUS PP. 11, EVANGELIUM
VITAE, 156 (1995), available at http://www.vatican.valedocs/ENG0141/_PP.HTM#-19. John Garvey
& Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQUETTE L. REv. 303 (1998), consider

both the authority of the church's teaching and the variety of roles judges may play in respect to capital
punishment.
6 See Bernard Haring, Does God Condemn Contraception?,COMMONWEAL, Feb. 10, 1989, at 6971 (observing two schools of thought within the Catholic Church on the usage of contraception).
Compare Charles Curran, Theologians on Birth Control: Spouses May Decide, WASH. POST., Jul. 31,
1968, at A18, and Press Release, Canadian Conf. of Bishops, Canadian Bishops' Statement on the
Encyclical "Humanae Vitae," 1 26 (Sept. 27, 1968), available at http://catholicinsight.com/
online/church/humanae/article_960.shtml with Press Release, U.S. Conf. of Cath. Bishops, Human Life
in Our Day, IT 37-45 (Nov. 15, 1968), available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisterium/
bishops/68-11-15humanlifeinourdaynccb.htm; O'Connor, supra note 73, 1 10.
1 See generally LINDA HOGAN, CONFRONTING THE TRUTH: CONSCIENCE IN THE CATHOLIC

TRADITION (2000). Hogan suggests a personalist ethics that recognizes that conscience is based on
reason, intuition, emotion, and imagination about consequences. Id. at 135-49.
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teachings without committing a sin. 88 On this issue, leading Catholic
thinkers have varied over the centuries. Although believing that individuals
should develop their sense of conscience based on the objective
requirements of natural law, Thomas Aquinas also wrote that "every
conscience, true or false, is binding, in the sense that to act against
conscience is always wrong."89 That emphasis is considerably removed
from those who urge that the institutional church's teachings on morality
should always be followed.
Given the prevailing social view about ordinary contraceptives and the
church's acceptance of the "rhythm method" to prevent pregnancies, an
outsider might well think that an individual Catholic's disagreement about
the church's view of contraceptives, which also prevent unwanted
pregnancies, would be as reasonable as disagreement with its view about
capital punishment. But the contrary view is that the position on
contraceptives is established by an authoritative and binding church
standard of the Magisterium, which includes statements by the Catholic
bishops and the Pope. 90
As I have noted, from the church's point of view, a pill that operates
after conception involves a more serious moral wrong than those that
prevent conception, and their use may be regarded as less susceptible to
conscientious disagreement by individual Catholics. 91 As far as I am aware,
no one has suggested a larger accommodation for religious organizations in
respect to any pill that may sometimes operate as an "abortifacient"; but I
wonder if an approach along these lines is feasible and could make a
difference to those involved.
The possibility of conscientious disagreement by individual Catholics
does not, of course, tell us what Catholic organizations, given the clear
convictions of their indisputable leaders, should be required to do; but it
8 The position taken by modem leaders within the church is that faithful members should adhere to
positions adopted by authoritative church statements. See JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER & TARCISIO

BERTONE, S.D.B., DOCTRINAL COMMENTARY ON THE CONCLUDING FORMULA OF THE PROFESSIO

FIDEI, (1998). One feature of differences in view about subjective conscience and its role concerns the
kind of reasoning that one uses to make moral judgments. See Curran, supra note 84, at 11-17.
Competing views about conscience by Catholic writers over the centuries are described by Linda
Hogan, supra note 87. She suggests that the presently dominant position within the church is
undesirably less sensitive to individual conscience than the vision of the Second Vatican Council.
89Hogan, supra note 87, at 4
90The status of various positions of the Magisterium is itself complex, see id., and about certain
positions there can be doubt as to whether they have been adopted by the Magisterium. See generally
READINGS INMORAL THEOLOGY No. 3: THE MAGISTERIUM AND MORALITY (Charles E. Curran &
Richard A. McCorkick, eds., 1982).
9' This may be indirectly implied by the U.S. Bishops' position on communion, supra note 78, and
Cardinal O'Connor's letter, supra note 73.
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could soften arguments that every use of contraceptives is necessarily
morally wrong in the sense of sinful. In respect to the woman who might
defend her action on the ground that she is doing a lesser moral wrong to
avoid a more serious one, I believe the church's position is that this is
unjustified, because people should not commit acts that are intrinsically
wrong in order to prevent other more serious moral wrongs. 92 The
perspectives of most individual Catholics could also influence how one
perceives the balance of reasons for and against particular forms of
exemption.
Whether the Catholic Church will develop one precise view about its
degree of involvement in insurance coverage is not yet clear. Were
religious organizations themselves required to distribute contraceptive
devices, that would definitely be a form of participating. Were taxes paid
by the organization to mix with other tax payments that together helped the
government to subsidize use of contraceptives, that presumably would be
acceptable (in the minimal sense of not generating an unresolvable
conflict).9 3 On a scale of increasing involvement from provision by the
government, we can put: (1) the organization pays for an insurance plan
that does not itself include contraceptives, but the insurance company must
provide free contraceptives (the proposed accommodation of the Obama
Administration); (2) the organization pays for coverage that itself includes
free contraceptives (this was the Administration's original position); (3)
the organization, as a self-insurer, directly provides free contraceptives or
directly pays companies to provide them. We know that the Catholic
Church and various other religious organizations strongly objected to the
Administration's initial proposal. Although some Catholic groups have
indicated they would find the proposed accommodations for companies
that are not self-insurers to be acceptable, 9 4 important members of the
Catholic hierarchy have objected that the "accommodation" proposal is
merely formalistic-that, in reality, given the price of the insurance, the
church would still be paying indirectly for the free contraceptives. The idea
of "paying" here is complicated by the likelihood that, given the costs of
pregnancies, the use of contraceptives may actually reduce the overall cost
92I discuss various views among Roman Catholic thinkers about this general position in respect to
the boundaries of a general justification defense in criminal law in Kent Greenawalt, NaturalLaw and
PoliticalChoice: The GeneralJustificationDefense, Criteriafor PoliticalAction, and the Duty to Obey
the Law, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1986).

93General taxes paid to the federal government do help subsidize some efforts to lower population
growth in foreign countries.
94Various positions by leading Catholic groups are noted and cited in Galston & Rogers, supra
note 59, at 4-5.
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of coverage. In one sense, then, the organization would not be paying
anything extra for contraceptives; but the overall funding it was providing
the insurance company would still partly be used for that purpose.
Clearly, the position the church favors is that it not be compelled to
support the use of contraceptives in any way whatsoever. But it is not
certain what exactly church organizations think should and will be the
practical consequence if a full exemption that goes beyond the
Administration's accommodation is not granted. In respect to state or local
requirements about nondiscrimination against gay couples, in respect to
adoption or foster care, some Catholic groups have decided to terminate
forms of activity, believing that the degree of participation in what would
be wrong is simply unacceptable. 95 Cardinal Francis George of Chicago
and other Catholic leaders have implied that such a response might take
place over health care requirements, given the steep penalties attached to
noncompliance for large institutions. 96 On the other hand, the church has
generally opposed government programs that encourage use of
contraceptives, but church connected organizations do not refuse to pay
taxes on that basis. We do not know how many church organizations
would react with a conscientious refusal to participate if the
Administration's plan goes into effect.97
This question of reaction can matter both at the levels of principle and
practicality. As far as principle is concerned, one could perceive an
organization's absolute refusal to accede, even if it must give up an activity
(such as maintaining a religious hospital or university) that it values greatly,
as demonstrating its intensity of conviction and its perceived magnitude of
the wrong it would be committing. Its "all or nothing" position, like that of
the pacifists' willingness to go to jail, would show the genuineness of its
insistence on an exemption for religious conviction. Although outsiders
might say the position is too unreasonable to deserve accommodation, they
could hardly deny the strength with which it is held. At the practical level,
those considering an exemption must assess the risk of withdrawal from
insurance provision or, more radically, from basic activities, and ask how
much would be lost for the good of society if many Roman Catholic (or
other religious) organizations made such decisions.

See Wilson, supra note 3, at 1446-47.
Id. at1448.
9 Of course, for self-insurers, the accommodation will not work; they would have to pay for the
coverage themselves, accept substantial penalties, or somehow arrange for other insurers to cover these
aspects of health care.
9

96
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Even if those making decisions about exemptions are confident that
organizations will not respond by withdrawal, that hardly eliminates all
concerns about a desirable exemption. Perhaps religious organizations
should not be forced indirectly to support acts they regard as immoral even
if doing so is preferable for them to ceasing to provide social benefits.
Here is my present and tentative conclusion about this issue. Given the
widespread acceptance and actual use of contraceptives among both the
broader population and individual Roman Catholics, and given the harms
that reasonably can be thought to be prevented by providing free
contraceptives to those who would otherwise find it difficult to afford them,
no resolution should sacrifice this interest. What does need further
exploration is whether there are other feasible schemes, such as
contraceptives provided by the government (perhaps only for those persons
who could not pay for them easily). 98 The government subsidy might be
accompanied perhaps by some special, but manageable, fee for
organizations that choose to opt out of standard forms of insurance
coverage. Such a fee could serve both as a means to preclude insincere
claims and to avoid a surplus secular benefit (money saving) for the
organization granted an accommodation based on moral convictions.99
Such a plan would allow religious organizations to avoid being involved
even to the degree of the Administration's proposed accommodation. Were
such an arrangement feasible, the value of protecting religious exercise and
liberty could be achieved without sacrificing health care for women. Any
negative symbolism an exemption might convey to some observers of a
lack of respect for women and women's health would then be greatly
reduced. Were such an arrangement respecting this aspect of religious
freedom workable, it could then be assessed whether the privilege involved
should extend to nonreligious groups.
In summary, the question of what exemptions should be made as a
matter of law or granted by those in charge of public and private
enterprises depends partly on how one perceives the nature of conscience,
its significance for individual liberty and social welfare. Further questions
are whether, and how far, religious claims of conscience are special, and
whether any organizations should be acknowledged as legitimately raising
' On possible provisions by the government, see Letter from Sr. Carol Keehan, President and CEO,
Catholic Health Ass'n of the United States, Robert V. Stanek, 2011-2012 Board Chairperson, Catholic
Health Ass'n, and Joseph R. Swedish, 2012-2013 Board Chairperson, Catholic Health Ass'n, to
Marilyn Taveenner, Acting Adm'r, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep't of Health and Human
Servs. (Jun. 15, 2012), available at http://www.modemhealthcare.com/assets/pdf/CH80052615.PDF.
9 The latter reason is emphasized in an article by Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights
Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 55, 70-81 (2006).
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such claims. In relatively simple situations, an exemption for some may
add to burdens borne by others, but reflects no negative attitude about what
the others are doing. Examples of this would be not requiring Orthodox
Jews to work on Saturday and excusing pacifists from military service. In
the more complex circumstances of same-sex marriage and health care
insurance, the very granting of exemption may reflect a strong negative
attitude by those receiving it toward the activities for which they seek the
exemption, and perhaps about the individuals who engage in them. Those
who participate in the practices themselves may feel that an exemption
somehow reinforces those negative attitudes, and represents a form of
intolerance or lack of concern for their identity and welfare. As the
discussion has reflected, this problem seriously complicates decisions
about what exemptions are good ideas; but it does not eliminate the
possible desirability of some limited exemption. To show this has been the
burden of this essay.

